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The US economy has been growing progressively more stable over the past half-century and perhaps
longer. Figure 1 depicts the ¯ve-year rolling variance of GDP growth using real, quarterly output
data starting in 1947. Economists have put forward various explanations for the recent US economic
stability. Fewer exogenous shocks, better ¯scal policy, better monetary policy, changes in inventory
management, and changes in the composition of output are among the explanations most often
cited.1 This paper focuses on the last of these factors.
The most striking changes in the composition of US GDP over the past half century have been
the relative decline of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors and the relative rise of the ¯nancial
and services sectors. Because manufacturing and agriculture are particularly volatile sectors, and
¯nance and services are particularly stable, it stands to reason that this restructuring of the economy
would substantially stabilize overall US output growth. Our analysis con¯rms this intuition. We
¯nd that a bit less than half of the decline in US output growth variance between the periods
before and after 1982 can be attributed to shifts in output composition. This ¯nding challenges
the conclusion of several recent studies which downplay the role of compositional changes. Not
surprisingly, the role of compositional changes appears to depend greatly on how one divides GDP
into components { by type of output, by type of expenditure, or by type of producer. Our growth
volatility decomposition exercises show that composition was an important part of stabilization
using the last of these series and less important for the others.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the relationship between composition and
volatility and introduces some relevant recent ¯ndings. Section 3 highlights the decomposition by
which we analyze the role of composition in output growth stabilization. Section 4 presents our
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Output Composition and Output Volatility
It is well known that the ten one-digit SIC sectors of the US economy have di®erent levels of
output volatility. In particular, sectors in which producers can postpone selling and consumers can
postpone buying, sectors which are capital intensive, and sectors whose products are vulnerable to
1foreign demand and exchange rate °uctuations tend to have volatile output.2 Manufacturing is a
volatile sector for all three reasons; ¯nance and services are relatively stable because none of the
above really apply.
Meanwhile, the relative size of these sectors in the US economy has changed markedly over
the past half century. In the period from 1947 to 1982,3 manufacturing was by far the largest of
the one-digit sectors, accounting for almost 26% of US output, more than twice the output of the
service and ¯nance sectors. In the period between 1982 and 2001, both ¯nance and services eclipsed
manufacturing, growing to around 18% of the US economy each, while manufacturing shrunk in
relative size to just under 18% of US output. Agriculture, which had been in a steady decline for
decades, shrank from over 4% of the US economy before 1982 to under 2% between 1982 and 2001.
Given that these well-known structural changes in the US economy tended to increase the relative
size of stable sectors compared to volatile ones, it seems reasonable to ask how much of the decline in
overall US output growth volatility in this period can be attributed to these compositional changes.
The argument that changes in overall stability could arise from compositional shifts among GDP
components of heterogeneous volatility is straightforward and intuitively compelling. Still, it has
not been well-received in recent e®orts to analyze the long-term stabilization of the US economy.
Blanchard and Simon (2001), observing that the rolling standard deviation of output growth using
¯xed 1947 shares of expenditures (consumption, investment, government spending, and net exports)
looks identical to the actual series, conclude that composition was inconsequential. McConnell and
Perez Quiros (2000) reject the role of composition by noting that an output series with shares of
goods, services, and structures ¯xed at the sample-wide averages still experienced a volatility break
in the second quarter of 1984. Reviewing the work of Warnock and Warnock (2000), Stock and
Watson (2002) use employment data to show that GDP growth volatility would have dropped by
about the same amount if the share of employment by 1-digit sector had remained at 1965 levels.
They also point out that the smooth shift from manufacturing to services could not explain the
early 1980s break in volatility that several researchers have detected.
Because the intuition behind a role for composition in the long-term stabilization of US GDP is
so strong, and because studies to date have approached di®erent data (i.e., various decompositions
of GDP based on expenditures by type, expenditures by purchaser, or employment) with disparate
2methods (i.e., breakpoint tests vs. holding shares ¯xed at average or starting values), we revisit
the issue. Our results suggest that compositional changes have, indeed, played a strong role in the
stabilization of US output growth, and that value-added by industry is the dimension along which
the e®ects of compositional changes can be seen most clearly.
3 A Decomposition of Output Growth Volatility
In order to measure more precisely the relative importance of changes in the composition of GDP
and of changes in the volatility of the components of GDP, we conduct the following simple de-
composition. We express the growth rate of GDP as the sum of sector growth rates multiplied by
their share of GDP (essentially, a weighted average growth rate). Simplifying notation, we denote
the growth rate of sector i from period t ¡ 1 to t by ^ Xit and the share of sector i in GDP at t ¡ 1




xi;t¡1 ¢ ^ Xit: (1)
Under the assumption that the sectoral shares are constant, xi;t¡1 ´ xi; we can write the variance
of the growth rate of an economy consisting of, say, sectors i and j as follows:
Var(^ Yt) = x2
i ¢ Var( ^ Xit) + x2
j ¢ Var( ^ Xjt) + 2xi ¢ xj ¢ Cov( ^ Xit; ^ Xjt): (2)
We extend such a framework to three alternative GDP series: expenditures (consumption,
investment, government, and net exports), products (durable goods, nondurable goods, services,
and structures), and production (value added by ten 1-digit SIC sectors). The Appendix provides
detail about each data series. In each case we use the nominal GDP series corrected for in°ation
using a GDP de°ator.4 For each sector and each period (pre- and post-1982), we calculate the
output growth variance and average GDP share, as well as covariance terms for every 2-sector
combination.
Dividing output growth volatility in the early and late periods into sector volatility components
and (¯xed) sector shares allows us to decompose the observed change in output growth volatility
into three parts: a part explained by changes in the sectoral output shares, a part explained by
changes in the variances and covariances of sector growth rates, and a part explained by interactions
3between sector composition and volatility. First, write the change in volatility for the two sector
economy using t = 2 to denote the late period and t = 1 to denote the early period:
¢Var(^ Y ) = Var(^ Y2) ¡ Var(^ Y1): (3)
Now, observing that it is possible to express any change in a two-term product A2¢B2¡A1¢B1 as
(A1+¢A)¢(B1+¢B)¡A1¢B1; and deleting ¢A¢¢B as negligible we get ¢A¢B1+¢B¢A1+¢A¢¢B.
We can rewrite the RHS of Equation (3), using equation (2), as the sum of three separate terms:
¢x2
i ¢ Var( ^ Xi1) + ¢x2
j ¢ Var( ^ Xj1) + 2¢(xi ¢ xj) ¢ Cov( ^ Xi1; ^ Xj1) (4)
+x2
i1 ¢ ¢Var( ^ Xi) + x2
j1 ¢ ¢Var( ^ Xj) + 2xi ¢ xj ¢ ¢Cov( ^ Xi; ^ Xj) (5)
+¢x2
i ¢ ¢Var( ^ Xi) + ¢x2
j ¢ ¢Var( ^ Xj) + 2¢(xi ¢ xj) ¢ ¢Cov( ^ Xi; ^ Xj): (6)
Expression (4) represents the part of ¢Var(^ Y ) due to changes in the share terms, which we will
refer to as the \composition e®ect." Expression (5) represents the part of ¢Var(^ Y ) due to changes
in the variance and covariance terms, which we will refer to as the \volatility e®ect." Expression
(6) represents the part of ¢Var(^ Y ) due to the interaction of changes in variance and covariance
terms with changes in the share terms, which we will refer to as the \interaction e®ect." It may
also be useful to notice that the composition e®ect is the sum of sector share changes, weighted
by their early period variances and covariances; the volatility e®ect is the sum of changes in sector
variances and covariances, weighted by their early period shares.
Before assessing the relative importance of changes in composition and volatility on output
growth volatility, it is straightforward to demonstrate that ¯xing sectoral shares within periods has
little e®ect on the dynamics of GDP growth. (This is not so surprising since shares should be far
less variable than growth rates.) Table 1 shows the output growth variance for our three GDP
series (expenditures,5 products, and production) both with ¯xed early- and late-period shares and
with the actual shares. In each case the variance calculated with ¯xed shares is quite close to the
observed variance, and the percentage drop from the early period to the late period is nearly the
same using ¯xed and actual shares. Since GDP by production sector is only available at annual
4frequency, we also work with annual versions of the other two series to show that the results are
comparable. Not surprisingly, the variance ¯gures for the annual series are lower than those for the
quarterly series. But here and elsewhere the analysis is the same regardless of the data frequency.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the results of our decomposition of total change in variance into composition,
volatility, and interaction e®ects for each of our GDP series. The results demonstrate that the
importance of compositional changes in the stabilization of output growth depends on how GDP is
decomposed. Changes in the mix of expenditures (consumption, investment, government spending,
net exports) and in the mix of products (durable and nondurable goods, services, and structures)
seem to have had a modest e®ect on output volatility. This result echoes ¯ndings of Blanchard and
Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2002), respectively. Changes in the mix of production sectors
(manufacturing, services, ¯nance, etc.), by contrast, are of decisive importance. Our volatility
decomposition by production sector suggests that a little less than half of the variance drop can be
attributed to changes in the relative size of the ten sectors of the US economy. Changes in variance
and covariance terms accounted for the rest. In all cases, but especially in the case of production,
the interaction e®ect was negative, meaning that on balance sectors that shrank (grew) in relative
size also became less (more) volatile.
Figures 2a{2c, which depict the GDP share and standard deviation of output growth by sector
for each of our three GDP series, provide a graphical sense of how composition and volatility e®ects
play di®erent roles in di®erent decompositions of GDP. These ¯gures plot sectoral share on the
horizontal axis and the standard deviation of sectoral output growth on the vertical axis. The
early and late period points are plotted for each sector and are connected by a line, with the sector
label closest to the late period point. A line pointing toward the origin thus indicates a drop in
both output growth volatility and share of GDP between the early and late periods. Figure 2a,
which depicts the expenditure series, shows clearly that compositional changes were small rela-
tive to volatility drops in imports, exports, investment, and government. (The remaining sector,
consumption, experienced a modest increase in volatility and drop in GDP share.) Compositional
changes were more signi¯cant for product sectors (Figure 2b), with the growth of the relatively
5stable services sector being the most signi¯cant change. Sector stabilizations clearly play a large
role here, with the large services sector and both goods sectors dropping signi¯cantly in volatility
(although the e®ect was counteracted by rising volatility in the smaller structures sector). Figure 2c
makes clear why the composition e®ect was largest for the producer series. While there are signi¯-
cant volatility drops in some sectors (particularly government, manufacturing, and transportation),
the horizontal movement of the stable ¯nance and service sectors to the right and the more volatile
manufacturing sector to the left signify a major reweighting of the economy towards stability.
Clearly, di®erences in the extent of compositional changes and the volatility of the sectors in
which these changes took place account for di®erences in the relative importance of the composition
e®ect in our three GDP series. It is less straightforward to determine the implications of this
¯nding. In theory, it would be possible to group the same macroeconomic data into sectors whose
composition does not change between periods (thus attributing 100% of the stabilization to the
volatility e®ect) or into sectors whose volatility does not change between periods (thus attributing
100% of the stabilization to the composition e®ect). Performing this exercise would undoubtedly
require creating groupings of economic activity that completely lack economic coherence, and the
results would tell us nothing about what caused the US economy to become more stable. To
the extent that compositional changes among economically meaningful categories (such as the
ones we use) can be tied to stabilization, though, we can draw conclusions about the reasons for
past stabilization and the prospects for future volatility. In our view, our ¯ndings on the role of
composition place an upper limit on the role of policy or luck in the stabilization of US output
growth in the period 1947{2001, and suggest that continued structural shifts toward more services
and ¯nance and less manufacturing will lead to continued stabilization.
4.1 The role of manufacturing
As depicted in Figure 2c and discussed earlier, the manufacturing sector is both a large and volatile
sector in the US economy, but both its size and volatility have declined signi¯cantly in the last half
century. It is worth taking a closer look at the consequences that these changes have had on the
stability of output growth.
One way to assess the role that manufacturing has played in the decline in US output growth
6volatility is to divide the economy-wide change in volatility into a part explained by manufacturing,
which involves 3 out of 30 variance terms and 30 out of 300 covariance terms from the total
decomposition by producer, and another part that is not explained by manufacturing, which involves
all the remaining variance and covariance terms. We report this decomposition in Table 3.
It is striking that, both in the total e®ect and in each decomposed e®ect category (that is, the
composition e®ect, volatility e®ect, and interaction e®ect), manufacturing alone accounts for the
entire change from the early to late period, while the rest of the economy generates a small e®ect
in the opposite direction. (Around half of manufacturing's total e®ect is due to covariance terms
with other sectors which, of course, cannot be attributed solely to changes in the size and stability
of manufacturing.) The ¯gures in Table 3 show that, at least in an accounting sense, a reduction in
the size of manufacturing and in its volatility were both important in stabilizing the US economy,
and the magnitude of the two e®ects was roughly the same.
The last column of Table 1 shows that a hypothetical economy without manufacturing would
have had much more stable growth over the whole period and would have exhibited a much smaller
drop in output growth volatility.6 The variance of the non-manufacturing economy's growth rate
is less than half the variance of the full economy's growth rate in the early period and about 25%
lower in the late period. The observed drop in growth volatility without manufacturing is under
10%.
Still focussing on the US economy excluding manufacturing, we again decompose the change in
variance into three parts. The results in the last column of Table 2 show that, when weighted by
their pre-1982 shares of GDP, sectors other than manufacturing were somewhat more volatile after
1982 than they were before, a result which is surprising considering the overall decline in output
growth volatility. It appears that stabilization of the government and transportation sectors were
counteracted by increased volatility in mining, agriculture, construction, and ¯nance (see Figure
2c). On the other hand, compositional shifts and interactions between compositional changes and
sectoral volatility changes tended to reduce volatility. These results suggest that very little if any
of the observed decline in output volatility is explained by changes in the output dynamics of
non-manufacturing sectors, and that only a small part is related to shifts in composition among
non-manufacturing sectors.
74.2 Compositional changes within manufacturing
The decline in manufacturing's role in the US economy can be linked to a number of factors, some of
which have been discussed in the popular press, including the increasing concentration of manufac-
turing facilities in lower-wage countries. We will not attempt to further analyze this phenomenon,
other than to reemphasize that it is one of the primary explanations for the stabilization of US
output growth.
There remains, though, the problem of explaining why manufacturing output has become more
stable. One plausible explanation is that composition e®ects are again at work. That is, particularly
volatile manufacturing industries may have grown more slowly than more stable manufacturing
industries. GDP data are not available by two digit SIC industry, but monthly data on gross output,
which measures production rather than ¯nal sales, are available from the US Census Bureau for
14 manufacturing industries starting in 1958. Because production data involve double counting,
working with such data is not equivalent to working with GDP data, but we expect that large
changes in the dynamics or composition of output would a®ect both series in roughly the same
way. Using the same method as in the previous section, we ¯nd that very little of the decline in
gross output volatility is explained by changes in the composition of manufacturing output. See
Table 4. Changes in the volatility of manufacturing output growth at the two-digit level, then, seem
to lie behind the dramatic decline in manufacturing output growth volatility. The next section will
assess one possible explanation for this phenomenon.
5 Conclusion
Any discussion of the long-run stabilization of US output must consider changes in the composition
of US output. Our decomposition of output growth volatility by one-digit industry indicates that
a bit less than half of the drop in volatility between the pre- and post-1982 periods is accounted
for by compositional shifts, most notably the decline of manufacturing and the rise of services and
¯nance.
8Footnotes
1. This list is based partly on John Simon's remarks at the conference \Structural Change
and Monetary Policy" sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco and the Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy Research, March 3-4, 2000.
2. See Filardo (1997) for a more complete discussion of the volatility of manufacturing output.
3. Our choice of January 1982 as a cut-o® is somewhat arbitrary, but is in line with conventions
and ¯ndings in relevant literature. Those studies that identify changes in the dynamics of GDP
growth through breakpoint testing all ¯nd breaks in the early 1980s. Kim and Nelson (1999) and
McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000) both place the break at 1984:I, and Stock and Watson (2002)
estimate a con¯dence interval of 1982:4 to 1985:3.
4. In using nominal shares, we follow McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000). If we were to correct
for relative price changes among sectors in this analysis, our results would probably indicate a
smaller role for composition: the price of services has risen relative to the price of goods, which
contributes to the fact that services have become a larger part of the nominal economy. Unfortu-
nately, the BEA's construction of GDP does not allow us to employ \real sector shares" and to
test the role of price-adjusted composition in output growth stabilization.
5. Reconstructing an output series using ¯xed sector shares is awkward for GDP by expen-
ditures, since net exports changed signs some 17 times between 1947 and 1980 (the last year for
which they were positive) and it is thus not possible to calculate a growth rate for that component.
Instead we separately include imports and exports, with imports being assigned a negative share
of GDP.
6. There may appear to be a contradiction between the last column of Table 3, which suggests
that the change in manufacturing terms was larger than the change for the whole economy, and the
last column of Table 1, which shows that a hypothetical economy without manufacturing would
have become slightly more stable from the early to the late period. The reason for this apparent
contradiction is that, in order to use the above decomposition to infer the volatility change in an
economy without manufacturing, we must ¯rst adjust the share terms to account for the absence
of manufacturing. Because manufacturing was larger in the early period than in the later period,
the early period shares for the rest of the economy should be boosted by more than the late
9period shares, which magni¯es the early period volatility and restores evidence of a volatility drop
(although quite small).
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11Table 1. Annual output growth volatility, fixed shares and actual shares 
 




Frequency Quarterly Quarterly Annual Annual Annual Annual
early 1.02E-03 9.35E-04 7.95E-04 7.86E-04 7.25E-04 3.70E-04
late 4.22E-04 4.15E-04 4.36E-04 3.73E-04 3.69E-04 3.34E-04
% change -58.6% -55.6% -45.2% -52.5% -49.2% -9.7%
early 9.42E-04 9.42E-04 7.36E-04 7.36E-04 7.36E-04 3.28E-04
late 4.40E-04 4.40E-04 3.99E-04 3.97E-04 3.97E-04 3.03E-04
% change -53.4% -53.4% -45.8% -46.1% -46.1% -7.7%








Table 2: Decomposition of change in output growth volatility  
 




Frequency Quarterly Quarterly Annual Annual Annual Annual
composition effect 17.4% 31.0% 59.8% 23.4% 32.4% 13.9%
volatility effect 86.2% 77.9% 64.1% 82.3% 73.4% -14.1%
interaction effect -3.5% -8.9% -23.8% -5.6% -5.9% 100.2% 
 









Total -3.59E-04 -1.92E-04 -3.96E-04 53.5% 110.3%
Composition effect -2.15E-04 -1.28E-04 -2.31E-04 59.6% 107.8%
Volatility effect -2.30E-04 -1.47E-04 -2.80E-04 64.1% 121.6%
Interaction effect 8.56E-05 8.76E-05 1.18E-04 102.4% 138.2%
% of total ∆ due to 
manufacturing terms ∆ in 
manufacturing 
variance terms









 Table 4: Decomposition of change in volatility of manufacturing gross output growth  
 
Percent change in total variance: -59.50%
Percent due to each component effect:
Composition effect -10.63%
Volatility effect -58.06%
Interaction effect 9.19% 
 











Figure 1: Rolling Variance of Quarterly GDP GrowthFigure 2: Sectoral Shares of GDP and Standard Deviation of Sectoral Output Growth, 1947-
1981 and 1982-2001 (sector labels at later point)  
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 Appendix: Details on Data Series 
 
 
Series Name Components Source Prices
GDP by 
Expenditures
Consumption, Investment, Government 
Spending, Net Exports
BEA National Income and Product Accounts, 
Table 1.1, "Gross Domestic Product"
Current dollars, adjusted for inflation 
with price index from BEA National 
Income and Product Accounts Table 
7.1, "Quantity and Price Indexes for 
Gross Domestic Product" 
GDP by 
Products
Durable goods, non-durable goods, services, 
and structures
BEA National Income and Product Accounts, 
Table 1.3, "Gross Domestic Product By Major 
Type of Product"
Current dollars, adjusted for inflation 
with price index from BEA National 
Income and Product Accounts Table 
7.1, "Quantity and Price Indexes for 
Gross Domestic Product" 
GDP by 
Producer
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining; 
construction; durable goods manufacturing; 
nondurable goods manufacturing; 
transportion; wholesale trade; retail trade; 
finance, insurance, and real estate; services; 
government (SIC 1-digit industries)
BEA Gross Domestic Product by Industry 
(value-added by 1-digit SIC sector) 
Current dollars, adjusted for inflation 
with price index from BEA National 
Income and Product Accounts Table 
7.1, "Quantity and Price Indexes for 





Food; tobacco; textiles; paper; chemicals; 
petroleum and coal products; rubber and 
miscellaneous plastic products; stone, clay, 
and glass products; metals; metal products; 
machinery; electronics;  transportation 
equipment; instruments
Census Bureau "Manufacturers' Shipments, 
Inventories, and Orders" (M3)
Current dollars, adjusted for inflation 
with BEA monthly price deflator   
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